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Reducing Healthcare Costs
Requires Good Market Design
PETER CRAMTON AND BRETT E. KATZMAN

A

s the Government comes to grips
with rising deficits, there is a bigger
economic tsunami lurking in the
background—many tens of trillions in unfunded Medicare costs.1
Innovations are desperately needed to contain
healthcare costs and avoid fiscal disaster. One
thing in need of change is Medicare’s pricing of
equipment and supplies using 25-year-old rate
schedules adjusted for inflation and periodically
cut. Everyone agrees that this outdated administered pricing system makes little sense.
The solution is to establish prices in competitive markets, and happily, Congress has
Peter Cramton is Professor of Economics at the University of
Maryland and an expert on market design. Brett E. Katzman
is Professor of Economics at Kennesaw State University; his
research on Medicare auctions won the Southern Economics
Association’s best paper award in 2008.

been pushing for certain Medicare supply prices to be set in competitive auctions. The problem is that even though this pushing began in
the 1997 Balanced Budget Act, after 13 years
Medicare’s proposed auctions are a scandal and
will result in an unsustainable system, loss of
quality and selective provision of supplies to
Medicare beneficiaries. The problems are predictable in theory and the pilot runs thus far
prove as much.
Pilot auctions began in two cities in 1999
and 2002. These had serious problems, which
led the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) to make minor changes before initiating the latest competitive bidding program
in nine cities in 2008. Congress cancelled the
2008 auctions due to complaints about unfair
qualification procedures and unsustainably low
prices. After further minor changes, the 2008
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auctions were rebid in November 2009. However, the auctions continue to have fatal flaws.
On September 20, 2010, we presented
our case by email with supporting materials to
over two-hundred experts, asking them to be
signatories to a letter to Health Subcommittee
Chairman Stark making the points expressed
here.2 The result was overwhelming: a group
of 167 experts signed the letter within our 48hour deadline. Only 22 declined to sign, and
in each case, responded that the reason for not
signing was insufficient time to fully review the
letter and other materials. Chairman Stark responded within two days with a letter to the
head of CMS concluding, “I urge you to give
these comments and recommendations serious
consideration. I would also request that you
inform me in a timely way as to whether CMS
plans to incorporate any of the recommended
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changes and if not, why not.” The ball is now
in CMS’s court.

their costs, have refused to sign contracts in the
pilot programs.

the problems

Flawed Median-Bid Pricing Rule

o what are the problems with the current
design? The overall problems are four. The
first three combine to assure that the auction
prices are severely distorted from competitive
market prices. The fourth, a lack of transparency, prevents the pricing problems from being quickly identified and corrected. The result
is wrong prices. Some are too high, causing
excess expense. Others are too low, causing
supply shortages and compromising service
quality. These problems will directly affect seniors and are completely unnecessary.

s in standard procurement auctions, bids
are sorted from lowest to highest, and
winners are selected, lowest bid first, until
the cumulative supply quantity equals the estimated demand. The odd part comes next.
The proposed system sets reimbursement
prices at the median of the winning bids,
rather than the clearing price, where supply
and demand balance. Thus, fifty-percent of
the winners are offered a contract price less
than their bids.
Since most providers are small, they lack
the resources to invest in information and
strategy in preparing bids. For them an effective and easy strategy is the low-ball bid. It is
a winning bid with a negligible effect on the
price. However, with many firms following
this strategy the median-bid price is significantly biased downward and possibly below
the cost of all suppliers. This possibility is not
a problem for the low-ball bidders since, as
described above, suppliers have the option of
not signing the contract in such an event. The

S

Bids Are Not Binding Commitments

I

n the Medicare auction bidders are not bound
by their bids. Any auction winner can decline
to sign a supply contract following the auction.
This undermines the credibility of bids and encourages low-ball bids in which the supplier
acquires at no cost the option to sign a supply
contract. This aspect of the proposed system has
led to the predictable outcome where a number
of bidders, realizing that prices were set below

A

implication is that many prices may be below
everyone’s costs and therefore be unsustainable. Not good. Again, this may lead to supply
disruptions and shortages, eroding access and
quality for beneficiaries and discouraging the
development of improved technologies.
Encourages Strategic Bid Skewing

T

he current system selects winners using
composite bids, which are an average of a
bidder’s bids across many products, weighted
by government demand estimates. This provides a strong incentive for bidders to distort
bids away from costs—the problem of bid
skewing. Bidders submit low bids on products
for which the government has overestimated
demand and high bids on products where the
government has underestimated demand. As
a result, prices for individual products do not
align with costs.
Bid skewing is a common problem in U.S.
timber auctions. There it leads to higher cost
uncertainty. Its impact in the Medicare auctions and beneficiaries will be much more
severe—selective fulfillment of customer orders. Medicare beneficiaries are likely to find
that only high-margin products are available.
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Lack of Transparency

I

n the Medicare auctions, it is unclear how
demand and bidder capacities are determined, which are the two main inputs other
than price bids used to determine the winners
and the product prices. In addition, both quality standards and performance obligations are
unclear. Remarkably, bids from the latest test
of the design, covering nine cities, were taken
in November 2009 and now more than ten
months later we still do not know which firms
were awarded contracts. This lack of transparency is unacceptable in a government auction,
leads to fraud and collusion, and is in sharp
contrast to well-run government auctions
such as the Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions.
These four fundamental problems suggest
that the likely long-run outcome will be a “race
to the bottom,” in which providers become increasingly unreliable, product and service quality declines, and fraud and abuse increases.
key features of a good auction design

C

ompetitive bidding techniques have improved dramatically over the last decade.
Complex auctions like the Medicare program

can be designed to achieve the objectives of
low cost and high quality with little implementation risk. The appropriate bidding
mechanism would arise from a collaboration
of government officials, industry representatives, and auction experts. It would emphasize transparency, good price and assignment
discovery, and strategic simplicity. The result
would be sustainable long-term competition
among suppliers that reduces costs while
maintaining high quality.
conclusion

T

he switch to market pricing is not easy for a
government agency. Medicare’s experience
with medical supplies illustrates the challenges
and offers important lessons. The key lesson
is that, although market methods hold much
promise, the government must collaborate with
both expert market designers and industry to
maximize the benefits of market methods. The
government would never consider building a
bridge without input from bridge experts; likewise, it should not attempt to build markets
without input from experts in market design.
The Medicare competitive bidding program demonstrates what can happen without

expert advice. The Medicare auction creates the
wrong incentives for bidders. The end result is
prices that differ dramatically from competitive
market prices. Continued roll-out of the current design will result in government failure,
both as a result of the decline in service quality
and selective provision of supplies to Medicare
beneficiaries.
Such a failure is not necessary. The government should develop a new system based on
our accumulated stock of knowledge about the
design of complex auction markets.
Using competitive bidding to price Medicare supplies is a sound idea, but only if it is
done right.

Letters commenting on this piece or others may
be submitted at http://www.bepress.com/cgi/
submit.cgi?context=ev.
notes
1. Alan Auerbach and William Gale discuss the size of
unfunded medicare costs. Available at: http://www.
brookings.edu/papers/2010/0917_federal_budget_
outlook_auerbach_gale.aspx.
2. See Peter Cramton’s “Email to Auction Experts on
the Medicare Competitive Bidding Program, ” Available at: http://goo.gl/Q1JR.
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